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INTRODUCTION
In 1926 Kevin O'Higgins, the Irish minister for justice, asked his parliamentary colleagues to consider the utility of the Irish appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In particular he asked them to consider 'whether it is a good court, whether it is a useful court, whether it is a necessary court'.
1 O'Higgins' uncompromising conclusion was that it was 'a bad court, a useless court, an unnecessary court.' 2 These remarks are indicative of the unhappy history of the appeal to the Privy Council from the Irish courts in the 1920s and 1930s. Irish nationalists regarded the Privy Council appeal as a serious affront to Irish sovereignty. In addition, many Irish people perceived the Privy Council as being biased against the new self-governing Irish state. 3 In 1922 Michael Collins, the leader of the Irish provisional government, stressed that there was a strong feeling prevailing in Ireland against the Privy Council on the grounds that several of its judges had publicly displayed hostile attitudes to the embryonic Irish state. 4 There is evidence that a substantial portion of the protestant minority of the Irish Free State did value the appeal to the Privy Council from the Irish courts. However, claims that the Privy Council appeal was necessary as a safeguard for the rights of the minority community tended to offend members of the majority catholic community and increased suspicions of bias.
Irish governments insisted that safeguards of this nature were unnecessary in the new Irish Free State. 5 Perceptions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as court that was inherently biased against the Irish Free State fuelled the opposition of Irish governments to the appeal throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
1 Dáil Debates, vol. 14, col. 331-4, 3 February 1926. 2 Ibid. at 334. O'Higgins later attempted to mollify any offence that might have been taken at these remarks. He explained to the other delegations at the Imperial conference of 1926 that when he had referred to the Privy Council as a 'bad court' he had not meant that it was inherently bad, but that in was bad from the point of view of the Irish Free State. The National Archives of the United Kingdom (henceforth TNA), CAB 32/56 E(IR-26) 4 th Meeting, 2 November 1926. 3 
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THE IRISH APPEAL IN THE EARLY 1920s
The unfortunate origins of the appeal to the Privy Council from the Irish courts did not augur well for its future. Despite this unfortunate beginning, the appeal actually had a 13 7 difficulties in the development of the Irish Constitution under conditions of good-will between Ireland and Great Britain'. 25 It would be fair to say that the Privy Council appeal enjoyed a brief 'honeymoon' period in the Irish Free State in the early 1920s. However, it is important not to exaggerate the nature or extent of this period of toleration. Irish nationalists remained suspicious of the appeal and their tolerance had definite limits. This tolerance was based on the perception that Irish appeals to the Privy Council would only be heard in very exceptional circumstances. In 1923 the Irish senate was informed by its chairman that the Privy Council would decline to grant leave to appeal to litigants from the Irish Free State unless there was 'some question of national importance involved or except the case raises grave constitutional issues'. 26 Irish officials always favoured the cessation of appeals to
London but did not necessarily advocate formal abolition in the early 1920s. Instead, Irish ministers expressed the hope that the appeal would gradually be rendered obsolete through non-usage. 27 Irish toleration of the Privy Council appeal was always confined to extremely narrow parameters. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the existence of this period of limited toleration. There were even some signs of positive engagement with appeals to the Privy Council that fell within the restrictive parameters deemed acceptable by the Irish. The Irish government did not object when the Privy Council granted leave to appeal in the case of Wigg and Cochrane v. Attorney General in 1926. 28 The government even appointed counsel to represent the Irish attorney general before the Judicial Committee.
Kevin O'Higgins, the Irish minister for justice, explained to members of the Irish parliament that the subject matter of this case was connected to the provisions of the 1921
Anglo Irish Treaty. This was a case that concerned relations between members of the British Commonwealth and, as such, was considered to be 'one of the kind of cases that 25 John G. What had caused this dramatic reversal of fortune? How had the goodwill that had built up in the early 1920s been squandered in such a short period of time? In order to answer these questions it necessary to turn our attention to one of the most prominent judges who heard appeals to Privy Council from the Irish Free State. We must now examine the life and career of Lord Cave. Keith noted that 'The Lord Chancellor in discussing this matter curiously and rather amazingly asserted that it was this sort of case which it had been intended to secure as a matter for appeal in the Constitution whereas it is clear from that instrument that constitutional issues alone were really intended to be safeguarded, since they alone are of Imperial interest.' A. The Attorney-General of England in order to reserve the right of appeal to some people in Ireland against the expressed wish of the majority of the nation, against the will of the Parliament and Government of Ireland, declared null in the Canadian statute a clause against which in itself they had no objection, against which no appeal had ever been taken to the Privy Council, and the application of which the Privy Council pronounced inadvisable. This evidences once more the fact that the Judicial Committee of the Privy
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Council is not primarily a tribunal, but a semi-political, semi-judicial body; and they do not ignore that fact in England. Canada 1921 Canada -1926 Canada , 1926 Canada -1930 Canada and 1935 Canada -1948 appeal to the Privy Council. Lord Cave helped to ensure that the Irish left the Imperial conference with a Dominion veto over their attempts at reform. The effect of the judgments associated with Cave was exacerbated by the nature of the office that he held. This was the hallowed office of lord chancellor which, until recently, spanned the executive, legislative and judicial spheres. 128 The Irish government had unfortunate encounters with Cave in each of these areas. Cave, as lord chancellor, 
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CONCLUSION
There are a number of points that should be raised in Cave's defence before concluding this article. Cave was by no means 'anti-Irish' in his personal sentiments. He was personally opposed to the brutal tactics adopted by the temporary constables of the Royal 155 Cave must be given credit for having the courage and honesty to acknowledge the possibility of error at a time when his life was rapidly drawing to a close. 156 Irish controversy, that renders the decision suspect when examined from a political perspective.
It is difficult to employ legal analysis to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the decision to grant leave to appeal in Lynham v. Butler. This is because the criteria used by the Privy Council in granting leave to appeal in this period were vague and ill-defined. Lord Buckmaster noted in 1923 that there had to be 'really serious considerations' while Lord Haldane noted the restriction of the appeal to cases involving 'some exceptional question' determined by the 'magnitude of the question of law involved' or the existence of a 'matter of public interest in the Dominion'. 158 The malleability of criteria of this nature is readily apparent. They were sufficiently flexible to allow Lord Cave to grant leave to appeal in Lynham v. Butler with full conviction that this action was perfectly consistent with settled practice. 159 It is far easier to reach firm conclusions when examining the political wisdom of this decision. There can be little doubt that, in this context, the decision was a terrible blunder.
In fact, the fundamental error made by Cave pre-dates all three of the aforementioned appeals to the Privy Council. His most serious mistake was that of getting mixed up in the quagmire of Irish politics while holding high judicial office. Attorney General and perhaps even in Nadan v. R was the decision to actually appear on the judicial panels that heard these cases. Cave was clearly unwilling to exclude himself from key appeals that directly or indirectly concerned the interests of the Irish Free State.
The decisions made in these cases support the conclusion that Cave was not above using his judicial position to safeguard and expand the jurisdiction of the Privy Council with respect to the Irish Free State. Yet, these decisions had precisely the opposite effect that Cave seems to have intended. They neither safeguarded nor expanded the jurisdiction of the Privy Council. Indeed, these decisions damaged the appeal to the Privy Council from the Canadian courts and doomed the appeal from the Irish courts. In the decades that followed the controversies initiated by Lord Cave would be used to support conclusions that questioned the very integrity of the Judicial Committee of the early twentieth century as an independent court of law.
Lord Cave was a man of his time and his career must be evaluated in that context.
He was convinced that the Privy Council was a vital pillar in ensuring the unity and stability of the British Empire. He cherished a deep belief that the British Empire was a force for good in the world. For many people the preservation of Empire and the continuance of the Privy Council appeal were heavily interlinked. One commentator declared that 'the King, the Navy and the Judicial Committee are three solid and apparent 161 
